Yom Kippur War: Crossing of the Suez Canal
At 14:00 on 6 October 1973 (Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement), Egypt opened Operation Badr with air strikes by more than 200 aircraft and an artillery preparation by about 2,000 guns. Anti-tank teams and a first wave of 4,000 infantry crossed in rubber boats, climbed the Israeli sand rampart with rope ladders and infiltrated between the strongpoints; engineers breached the rampart with high-pressure water pumps, pontoon bridges were laid that night and tanks crossed in large numbers. Following the "Dovecote" plan, the IDF pushed its tanks forward and suffered heavy losses in Egyptian anti-tank ambushes, and most Bar Lev Line strongpoints were surrounded and fell. On 8 October Adan's division's counterattack around El Firdan failed, and the five Egyptian bridgeheads merged into two army bridgeheads 10–15 km deep. On 14 October, to relieve pressure on the Syrian front, Egyptian armour left its air-defence missile cover to attack toward the passes and was met head-on by Israeli tanks and aircraft, losing about 250 tanks.
Belligerents
- Egypt — Five infantry divisions of the Second and Third Field Armies crossed, with the 21st and 4th Armoured Divisions in reserve; on 8 October about 90,000 men and 980 tanks on the east bank, and about 2,000 guns
- Israel — Before the war, about 18,000 troops in the Sinai, the 252nd Armored Division with some 290 tanks and about 450 men in the Bar Lev Line strongpoints; on 7–8 October reserve forces including Adan's 162nd Division and Sharon's 143rd Division arrived
Outcome:Egypt successfully crosses the canal and consolidates a bridgehead about 15 km deep on the east bank; the offensive into the interior on 14 October fails and the initiative passes to Israel
Casualties:Egypt: About 280 killed and 20 tanks lost before the morning of 7 October; in the 14 October offensive at least 250 tanks and about 200 armoured vehicles lost and more than 1,000 casualties;Israel: About 200–300 tanks lost in the first two days, most of the Bar Lev Line garrison killed or wounded, about 200 captured; Adan's division lost about 100 tanks on 8 October; on 14 October 665 casualties and fewer than 40 tanks hit
Commanders
- Ahmad Ismail Ali (Egypt) — Egyptian Minister of War and commander-in-chief of the armed forces
- Saad el-Shazly (Egypt) — Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces, principal planner of the crossing
- Saad Mamoun (Egypt) — Commander of the Second Field Army
- Shmuel Gonen (Israel) — Head of IDF Southern Command
- Albert Mandler (Israel) — Commander of the 252nd Armored Division, killed 13 October
- Avraham Adan (Israel) — Commander of the 162nd Armored Division, counterattacked on 8 October
Course of the battle
1973.10.06 14:00Air strikes and artillery preparation
At 14:00 more than 200 Egyptian aircraft struck airfields, HAWK missile sites, command posts and radar stations in the Sinai; from 14:05 about 2,000 guns began a 53-minute artillery preparation in four rounds, with about 10,000 shells landing in the first minute. Israel had expected the attack to begin in the evening; at this point only some of the strongpoints were fully manned, and the armoured forces were still in the rear.
1973.10.06 14:20The first wave crosses in rubber boats
As soon as the artillery preparation began, tank-hunter teams armed with RPG-7s and Sagger anti-tank missiles crossed first, occupying the IDF tank firing ramps and setting ambushes. At 14:20 the first wave of 4,000 infantry crossed simultaneously in five sectors in about 2,500 rubber and wooden boats, climbed the sand rampart with rope ladders, and bypassed the strongpoints to infiltrate in depth; at 14:35 the Egyptian flag was raised on the east bank, with a further wave crossing roughly every 15 minutes thereafter.
1973.10.06 15:30The "Dovecote" plan: IDF tanks rush to the canal
Under the "Dovecote" plan, the IDF sent Reshef's 14th Brigade and other armour toward the canal by company and battalion to link up with the strongpoints, but without prior reconnaissance they ran straight into Egyptian infantry anti-tank ambushes, and tanks that reached the water's edge came under fire from the high ramparts on the west bank. At 15:30 the Lahtzanit strongpoint in the northern sector became the first of the Bar Lev Line strongpoints to fall; in the Great Bitter Lake sector, the Egyptian 130th Amphibious Brigade crossed the lake directly in amphibious vehicles.
1973.10.06 17:30High-pressure water cannons breach the sand rampart
Engineers turned light petrol-driven pumps, brought over on rafts, against the sand rampart; the first passage was opened in less than an hour, and eventually about 60 passages were cut. By 17:30 twelve waves of infantry, about 32,000 men in all, had entered the five bridgeheads, and 85 mm and 100 mm anti-tank guns had also come ashore; by this time the IDF had lost about 100 tanks. From 17:50 four Sa'iqa commando battalions were landed by helicopter deep in the Sinai to harass IDF reinforcement routes.
1973.10.06 22:30Bridging; tanks cross through the night
After dark Egyptian armoured and anti-tank units moved to the crossing points, and 35 ferries were assembled before 18:15. Between 22:30 and 01:30 the next morning all 8 heavy and 4 light pontoon bridges were completed, and ferries and bridges carried tanks and vehicles across all night; to avoid air strikes, the bridges were periodically shifted between several passages. In the 19th Division's sector at the southern end, the sand rampart turned to mud when wet, and the bridges there were about 7 hours behind schedule.
1973.10.07The bridgeheads expand and the strongpoints fall
By daybreak on 7 October there were about 50,000 men and 400 tanks on the east bank, and the bridgeheads were 6–9 km deep; during the night IDF tanks twice broke through to the water's edge and damaged two bridges, but were quickly surrounded and destroyed. The 18th Division cleared Qantara house by house and took the town and two nearby strongpoints that day. At noon Gonen decided to organise a defence along the lateral road about 30 km east of the canal, and the reserve divisions of Adan and Sharon began to arrive.
1973.10.08 13:30The counterattack at El Firdan fails
Adan had planned to strike from north to south along a line 3–5 km east of the canal, but Amir's brigade took the wrong route and could only make a frontal east-to-west charge against the 2nd Division bridgehead. At 13:30 the brigades of Amir and Nir attacked without coordination; Abu Saada, commanding the 2nd Division, deliberately let the IDF advance to about 3 km from the canal, then the 24th Armoured Brigade and anti-tank weapons on the flanks opened fire from three sides, destroying more than 50 tanks within a little over ten minutes; the Israeli battalion commander Yaguri was taken prisoner.
1973.10.08 16:00Two army bridgeheads
That afternoon the Egyptian army expanded its bridgeheads as planned; the 16th Division, after about two and a half hours of fighting, seized key points including Mashhir, "TV", "Missouri" and Hamutal, and the Third Army bridgehead approached 18 km in depth. The five divisional bridgeheads merged into two: the Second Army's from Qantara to Deversoir and the Third Army's from the southern end of the Bitter Lakes to south-east of Port Tawfiq, with about 90,000 men and 980 tanks in all. A counterattack by the IDF's Keren Brigade to retake Hamutal failed.
1973.10.09Sharon's brigade-level attack is repulsed
Early on 9 October Chief of Staff Elazar decided to suspend offensive operations in the Sinai until the Syrian front was settled; by then only about 400 tanks remained in the Sinai. Sharon's division nonetheless attacked the 16th Division bridgehead that day with a brigade-sized force, making some initial progress before being driven back by nightfall with the loss of about 60 tanks. The same day reconnaissance troops of Reshef's brigade discovered a gap between the Second and Third Armies at the northern end of the Great Bitter Lake.
1973.10.13Days of standoff; Mandler killed
From 10 to 13 October neither side undertook large-scale operations; the Egyptians used helicopters to land commandos behind IDF lines, most of whom were wiped out. On the 13th Mandler, commander of the 252nd Division, was killed in his command vehicle by artillery fire or a missile, and Kalman Magen took over. The Egyptian leadership then decided to move the reserve armoured divisions across the canal and attack east to relieve pressure on the Syrian front; Shazly opposed this decision.
1973.10.14 06:15Egyptian armour attacks east
Early on the 14th the Egyptian army attacked east with 800–1,000 tanks along six axes on a broad front, aiming at the Mitla and Gidi passes and the IDF command centre at Bir Gifgafa (Refidim). The attacking forces had left the range of their surface-to-air missile cover and could rely only on the Egyptian Air Force for protection; about 700–750 IDF tanks were already in position on the high ground, and the night before Israeli commandos had raided the Egyptian signals-intercept station at Jebel Ataqa.
1973.10.14 13:00The offensive is repulsed
Apart from an outflanking move along a valley at the southern end, the Egyptian columns mostly made frontal assaults on IDF positions and suffered heavy losses to tank guns, anti-tank missiles and air strikes. By early afternoon at least 250 Egyptian tanks and about 200 armoured vehicles had been destroyed; fewer than 40 IDF tanks were hit, most of which were repaired and returned to action. This defeat used up most of the Egyptian armoured reserve on the west bank, and the IDF immediately prepared a counter-crossing of the canal through the gap between the two armies.